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Summary
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America.  It has a sizeable and
active indigenous population, a long history of coca cultivation, weak political
institutions, and continuing political unrest.   The country has become increasingly
polarized in recent years with regard to disputes over oil and gas revenues, coca
eradication programs, and calls for regional autonomy from some parts of the
country.  Despite these challenges, the country has made some social and economic
progress over the last several decades.  Coca cultivation has decreased from its peak
production years in the 1990s, but is still a source of conflict between the government
and coca growers.  While political institutions are considered weak, a change in
government took place in 2003 according to constitutional provisions.
U.S. interest in Bolivia centers on its role as a coca producer, and its relationship
to Colombia and Peru, the two other major coca- and cocaine-producing countries.
Some observers have criticized this focus for neglecting economic and social
development issues, but the State Department defends it as necessary to promote licit
economic development and democracy.  Bolivia has the second-largest natural gas
reserves in Latin America after Venezuela.  The Bolivian government has plans,
which have generated considerable controversy, to export gas to the United States
and Mexico, necessitating the construction of a pipeline to a coastal port of a
neighboring country.
Political protests during 2003 led to the resignation of President Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada on October 17, 2003, fifteen months after he was elected.
Succeeding him as President was his former vice president, Carlos Mesa, a popular
former television journalist, historian, and political independent.  This change in
leadership came about after months of protests led by indigenous groups and workers
who carried out strikes and road blockages that resulted in up to 80 deaths in
confrontations with government troops.  The focus of the protests was the continued
economic marginalization of the poorer segments of society, especially in response
to government budget cutbacks and proposals to raise taxes.  The final spark, which
immediately preceded Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation, was his plan to export
natural gas via a port in Chile, an historic adversary of Bolivia.   
The new president has faced many difficulties in governing a politically
fractured society, within a context of a highly mobilized indigenous community,
continuing street protests, and his inability to obtain consensus on natural gas exports
as a basis for the country’s future economic development.  The change in government
and the role that indigenous groups played in it represents challenges for U.S. policy,
which is seen as focusing almost exclusively on coca eradication and less on
equitable economic development policies.  
For additional information, see CRS Report RL32337, Andean Counterdrug
Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance, by Connie
Veillette. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Bolivia: Political and Economic Developments
 and Implications for U.S. Policy
Background
Bolivia is a land-locked country approximately three times the size of Montana.
As a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) with Chile, Bolivia lost part of its
territory along the Pacific Ocean.  Bolivia has preferential rights of access to the
Chilean ports of Antofagasta and Arica, but it has no sovereign access, a source of
lingering resentment among Bolivians.  The population of 8.4 million people is the
most ethnically diverse on the continent of South America. Quechua and Aymara are
the two predominant indigenous groups who live largely in the altiplano and highland
regions.  Approximately 25% of the Bolivian population are Quechuan, 17% are
Aymaran, 30% are mestizo (mixed), while 12% are of European origin.  A 2001
census recorded that about 62% of Bolivians 15 years of age and older identified
themselves as indigenous.  Seventy percent of Bolivians live below the poverty level
with 34.3% earning less than $2 a day, and the average per capita annual income was
$900 in 2002, according to the World Bank.
Bolivia has been a major producer of coca leaf, the main ingredient in the
production of cocaine.  Although coca leaf is legal in the country for traditional uses
and is grown legally in some parts of the country, its cultivation for illegal purposes
increased in the 1970s and 1980s.  Cultivation levels have decreased to half of the
levels of the 1990s in response to government policies to eradicate illicit production,
according to the State Department.  These policies, and the way in which they have
been implemented, have caused social unrest and economic hardship in the two main
coca-growing regions.  One consequence has been the rise of coca growers trade
unions and an associated political party that now holds the political leadership of
many municipalities as well as seats in the national legislature.  Its leader, Evo
Morales, finished a close second in presidential elections in 2002 and is considered
a viable candidate for the 2007 elections.
Political Conditions
Political protests during 2003 led to the resignation of President Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada on October 17, 2003, fifteen months after he was elected.
Succeeding him as president was his former vice president, Carlos Mesa, a popular
former television journalist, historian, and political independent.  This change in
leadership came about after months of protests led by indigenous groups and workers
who carried out strikes and road blockages that resulted in up to 80 deaths in
confrontations with government troops.  The focus of the protests was the continued
economic marginalization of the poorer segments of society, especially in response
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to government budget cutbacks and proposals to raise taxes.  The final spark that
immediately preceded Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation was his plan to export natural
gas via a port in Chile, an historic adversary of Bolivia.
Gonzalez Sánchez de Lozada of the centrist National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR) won the presidential election in 2002 with 22.5% of the vote.  He had also
served as President from 1993 to 1997, and as planning minister from 1986 to 1988,
during which he became recognized as the architect of free market economic reforms.
Evo Morales of the leftist Movement to Socialism (MAS) who ran on a platform
critical of free-market policies and advocating indigenous rights, came in second in
the 2002 presidential elections with 20.9% of the vote.  As neither achieved a
majority, the Congress, in accord with provisions of the Bolivian constitution,  chose
Sánchez de Lozada as President.  He assembled a fragile coalition of the center-left
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and, for a time, the populist center-right
New Republican Force (NFR), the latter having initially served as an opposition party
along with the MAS.  A traditionally strong party, the center-right Nationalist
Democratic Action (ADN) showed poorly in the elections.
Sánchez de Lozada faced many political and economic challenges upon taking
office.  His small margin of victory, by only 43,000 votes over Morales, and his
unstable governing coalition did not provide him with a governing mandate.  In order
to secure an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement, with its strict budget
deficit targets, he proposed unpopular measures, such as tax increases, that led to
popular discontent.  In February of 2003, violent worker demonstrations erupted at
the same time as a police strike, the latter protesting reduced resources under the
President’s budget proposal.  Worker protests, combined with the police strike, and
student demonstrations, led to violent clashes with the military that left 31 people
dead.  Protests continued at varying levels during the summer of 2003, growing in
strength throughout the country as two Indian leaders became involved:  Evo Morales
of the MAS and Felipe Quispe of the Bolivian Coordinator of Syndical Unions and
Campesino Workers (CSUTCB) and an opposition legislator.
The trigger for the most violent protests in October 2003 was a presidential
proposal to export natural gas via pipeline to Mexico and California by way of Chile.
This sparked nationalist sentiment that recalled not just Bolivia’s loss in the War of
the Pacific, but past exploitation of the country’s natural resources of silver and tin
by foreign business interests.  Just as most Bolivians do not believe that they
benefitted from these earlier ventures, many present-day protesters believe that they
will not benefit from the expected natural gas revenues, a sentiment fueled by a
growing anti-globalization attitude.1  These events occurred against a backdrop of
growing resentment against U.S. policy that stressed coca eradication, affecting
approximately 50,000 growers who make their livelihood from both its licit and illicit
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cultivation.  Some observers have also argued that resentment has grown in response
to the role of the IMF’s requirements for additional loans.2
Mesa Administration
The violent demonstrations and street blockages that paralyzed most of the
country in September and October of 2003 resulted in up to 57 deaths.  The
withdrawal of support by Vice President Carlos Mesa and members of President
Sánchez de Lozada’s governing coalition left the president with little recourse but to
resign, which he did on October 17, 2003.  He was succeeded by Vice President
Mesa, a newcomer to politics and an independent with no formal political party as
a base of support.  The parties comprising the former government pledged their
support for the new administration.  Opposition party leaders, such as Evo Morales
and Felipe Quispe, initially promised to give the new government some breathing
room, although they have both been vocal critics since then.  
Mesa appointed a new cabinet, also largely of political independents, and has
demonstrated a sensitivity to indigenous issues.  He created the cabinet post of
Minister for Indigenous Affairs and announced plans for a referendum on the export
of natural gas.  Acceding to demands of indigenous and opposition groups, he also
overturned a 1997 decree that had given oil companies ownership of the natural gas
they extracted.  He unveiled an economic plan that puts most of the tax burden on
energy companies and wealthy citizens.  He has also shepherded reform legislation
through Congress that allows more popular participation in elections.  Further, he
announced plans for a constituent assembly to consider a new constitution.  With his
lack of political experience, a highly mobilized opposition, and his independent
status with regard to political party, many observers predicted that the challenges to
his success might be insurmountable.3  Since taking office, his popularity has fallen
in many parts of the country, although it remains above 70% in the capital of La Paz.4
Constitutionally, Mesa can serve the remainder of Sánchez de Lozada’s term,
which runs until June 2007.  Despite threats to step down, it appears he will serve the
full term.  During his tenure, he has faced a number of challenges.  First, civil
society, in the form of trade unions, peasant organizations, and student groups,
remains highly mobilized.  They often resort to public demonstrations and road
blockages to present their demands to the government.  Second, Mesa has no political
party as a base of support, and the Congress is dominated by parties that are generally
opposed to many of his policies.  Third, Mesa had difficulty getting congressional
approval of a new hydrocarbon law, called for as a result of a July 2004 referendum
in which Bolivians voted to support a more engaged role for the state in the oil and
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gas sector.  Fourth, in order to secure continued assistance from international
financial institutions, Bolivia would like to be able to rely on exports of its abundant
natural gas reserves, but tensions with Chile over sovereign access to a Pacific port
put these plans in jeopardy.  Fifth, U.S. pressure to maintain coca eradication and
interdiction programs continues to meet strong resistance from coca growers and
others.  Sixth, municipal elections in December 2004 further weakened the country’s
traditional political parties in favor of MAS candidates and independent groups that,
under a new law, have easier access to putting candidates on the ballot.  And seventh,
the resource-rich eastern section of the country, centered around Santa Cruz, is
pushing for more regional autonomy and the devolution of power to elected
governors and regional assemblies.  This successionist movement is opposed by most
of the rest of the country.
Role of Indigenous Groups
Despite the National Revolution of 1952, in which the indigenous population
held sway and benefitted from land reform and expanded suffrage, indigenous groups
have  not been politically active, with few of their members having served in elective
office. In the 1980s, indigenous-based political parties and movements emerged, and
there are now 41 members of the national legislature representing indigenous parties
(Movement Toward Socialism, or MAS, and the smaller Indigenous Pachakuti
Movement, or MIP).  They have used Congress as a forum to advocate indigenous
rights and have become increasingly vocal in making demands for equitable
economic development, including the demand to be able to cultivate coca, and the
preservation of indigenous land and culture.
The issue of land tenure has been a long-standing source of conflict.  An
Agrarian Reform Law allows indigenous communities to have legal title to their
communal lands.  However, these communities argue that their lands have not been
legally defined or protected, and that outsiders have been allowed to exploit their
resources.5  There have been numerous land occupations by landless farmers, some
resulting in confrontations with police forces.  The cultivation of coca, which is legal
in the province of Yungas, is another source of conflict.  Coca leaf is used legally by
indigenous communities for spiritual and medical purposes, and its use is considered
an important indigenous cultural right.  U.S. and Bolivian policy to eradicate illegal
cultivation aggressively has met with violent protests in recent years. 
The two most prominent indigenous leaders are Evo Morales, former
presidential candidate and current Member of Congress, who leads the opposition
MAS party, and Felipe Quispe, current Member of Congress from the MIP party and
campesino union leader.  A Quechuan Indian and former coca grower, Morales has
based his rise in politics on the support of coca growers and has since attracted other
followers who are admittedly anti-American in outlook.  Quispe, an Aymaran Indian
and rival of Morales, considers Morales to be a mainstream politician who will
continue free market policies.  Both have been very critical of the Mesa
Administration.  It is believed Mesa will again run for president in 2007.
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Constituent Assembly and Regional Devolution 
One of the pledges Mesa made upon becoming president was for a constituent
assembly to reform the constitution.  It was planned to occur in 2004, but
disagreements with the Congress on the subjects to be considered and other logistical
considerations have postponed it.  At the same time, there is now considerable
attention being given to a still undefined devolution of authority to Bolivia’s nine
departments, including the direct election of governors.  Department governors are
now appointed by the executive.  The constituent assembly and regional devolution
have been further complicated by calls from the resource-rich areas around Santa
Cruz for some semblance of regional autonomy, with implications for how central
government resources are distributed.  This successionist movement is supported by
four regions,and opposed by the less wealthy regions, causing a further fracturing of
Bolivian politics.  The debate is focusing on when these three elements —
gubernatorial elections, the constituent assembly, and regional devolution legislation
— might take place, and the order in which they should happen.  Gubernatorial
elections are tentatively scheduled for August 2005, but without a plan for devolving
power to the regions, critics argue that newly elected governors will have little
authority.6
Referendum and Energy Legislation 
Mesa put his presidency on the line in promising to hold a national referendum
on the role of the state in the energy sector, vowing to step down if he lost.  In the
July 18, 2004 vote, Mesa received overwhelming support for what many observers
characterized as ambiguously worded questions that support an increased state role
in gas exploration and production, while stopping short of nationalization.  The
referendum also endorsed using “gas as a strategic resource for the achievement of
a useful and sovereign outlet to the Pacific Ocean,” and the export of gas with profits
to benefit Bolivian industrialization, education, health, roads, and job creation.
As a result of the referendum, Mesa sent legislation to the Congress that would
replace the 1996 Hydrocarbons Law, which had opened Bolivia’s hydrocarbons
sector to private investment.  The state-owned energy company Yacimientos
Petroliferos Bolivianos (YPB) would resume a more active role in oil and gas
operations.  Under the 1996 law, YPB became an overseer of contracts with the
private sector, rather than engaging directly in exploration and production.  The
proposed legislation would also raise taxes on oil and gas production, and re-
establish state ownership of oil and gas “at the wellhead.”  Existing contracts with
oil companies, most foreign-owned, would need to be renegotiated.  The legislation
ran into opposition by those in the Bolivian Congress who want full nationalization,
and the hydrocarbon sector, which believes the new law would reduce its
competitiveness.  The largest single party in the legislature is Evo Morales’s MAS
party, which has advocated nationalization.  
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In May 2005, the Congress approved legislation that created a non-deductible
32% Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) that would apply to production and
maintained the current 18% royalty rate.  Foreign firms have six months to bring their
current contracts into line with the new legislation.  The legislation represents the
middle ground between Morales’ call for a 50% tax and business interests who
argued that gas reserves would go undeveloped.  President Mesa opposed the bill, as
amended by the Congress, because he argued it would put too heavy of a burden on
foreign investors and would require, rather than make it voluntary for, foreign
companies to renegotiate their prior contracts.  However, instead of vetoing the
measure, he returned it to the legislature for promulgation.  Foreign oil companies
have criticized the new law, threatened to take legal action over having their existing
contracts rewritten, and predicted that new investments would not be feasible.
Between 1997 and 2003, energy firms spent about $3 billion on exploration of
Bolivia’s natural gas reserves.7
Local Elections
An initial test of party popularity and strength was the municipal elections in
December 2004, the first elections since the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada. The
elections were the first to benefit from passage of a new law that was designed to
increase the participation of representatives of civil society and indigenous groups.
The new law ended the requirement that only officially registered political parties
could field electoral candidates. Bolivia’s traditional political parties (MNR, MIR,
ADN) largely have been discredited in the eyes of the public.  This left the MAS, the
party identified with representing indigenous and coca growing groups, as the
potential beneficiary in municipal elections.  The MAS already controlled more than
300 municipalities prior to the election, and its leaders predicted that it would pick
up another 250 in December.8  In fact, the MAS did well, but did not pick up nearly
as many seats as they predicted.  However, what became apparent from the results
is that the traditional parties have lost popular support in favor of independent
candidates.  The MAS, the most-voted-for party, won 15.8% of the vote, and its
candidates were elected town councillors in most municipalities.9  Municipal
elections could indicate popular preference with regard to 2007 elections for
President and Congress, in which it is generally believed Evo Morales will be a
viable presidential candidate.
Human Rights
With increased rates of coca eradication begun in 1998 with then President
Pastrana’s Plan Dignidad, charges of human rights abuses committed by security
forces have increased.  The State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human
CRS-7
10   Kathryn Ledebur and John Walsh, “Memorandum: Flawed State Department Report on
Human Rights in Bolivia,” Andean Information Network and Washington Office on Latin
America, July 9, 2004.
11  Ibid.
Rights Practices for 2004 recognized improvements from the previous year when it
reported that serious problems existed with regard to deaths of protestors at the hand
of security forces, the excessive use of force, extortion, torture, and improper arrests.
Congress has also expressed concern with human rights abuses.  Report
language accompanying the FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-199) recognized the lack of progress in investigating and prosecuting human
rights cases by Bolivian authorities, and urged the Secretary of State to give higher
priority to these issues.  The Appropriations Committee required the Secretary of
State to make a determination with regard to whether Bolivian security forces are
respecting human rights and cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of
alleged violations, and to submit a report to the committee substantiating the
determination.  Funding for FY2004 was not made contingent on the determination.
The State Department submitted its congressionally mandated report on April
22, 2004. In a seeming contradiction of its annual human rights report, the
department’s April report to the committee stated that “the Bolivian military and
police respect human rights and cooperate with civilian authorities in the
investigation, prosecution and punishment of personnel credibly alleged to have
committed violations.”  It also states with regard to February and October 2003
protests that “despite unrest created by two episodes of major social upheaval, the
military and police acted with restraint and with force commiserate [sic] to the threat
posed by protestors.”  The April report has been criticized by human rights
organizations for being factually incorrect and poorly written.10  Those organizations
argue that 31 civilians died in February and 57 in October, with most deaths resulting
from gunshot wounds of high-caliber munitions used by security forces. The annual
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 also states
that the military and police were responsible for civilian deaths during protests in
2003.  It made no qualifying statement that the use of lethal force was commensurate
with the threat posed by protestors, as did the April report. The groups also refute the
State Department’s assertion in the April report that the Bolivian military and police
cooperate in investigations of human rights abuses, citing numerous instances where
the Bolivian Human Rights Ombudsman or prosecutors have stated that cooperation
has not been forthcoming.11
Economic Conditions
Like much of Latin America, Bolivia pursued state-led economic policies during
the 1970s and early 1980s.  In the mid-1980s, however, external shocks, the collapse
of tin prices, a major foreign revenue earner, and higher interest rates combined with
hyperinflation forced Bolivian governments to adopt free market economic policies.
Bolivia was one of the first countries in Latin America to implement economic shock
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therapy under an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program.
In the 1990s, many state-owned corporations were privatized.  Gross domestic
product growth from 1990 to 2000 averaged 3.5%.  Sluggish economic growth in
2001 and 2002 (1.2% and 2.5%, respectively)12 fueled resentment that the benefits
of globalization and free market economic policies were not reaching most of the
impoverished population.
The IMF approved the fifth review of a one-year standby agreement on April 8,
2005, and extended the agreement for one year.  This action authorizes the release of
$14.5 million in loan funds.  The previously negotiated standby agreement provided
about $110 million to assist economic reforms and the continuation of support under
the IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPIC) initiative.
Coca Cultivation and Alternative Development
Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but it has been a major
coca producer in the past.  Some argue that Bolivia’s earlier significant gains in
reducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in controlling
production in Colombia through a “balloon effect” whereby coca production shifts
to other areas with less law enforcement presence. Once the world’s foremost
producer of coca leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducing coca cultivation under
the Banzer-Quiroga administration (1997-2002).13   However, forcible eradication of
coca has become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class and
ethnicity that may foment political instability.    Moreover, according to the State
Department, coca cultivation increased 23% in 2002 and 17% in 2003.14
Nevertheless, Bolivia’s coca cultivation is still about half of its 1995 levels.  It should
be noted that Bolivian law allows nearly 30,000 acres (12,000 hectares) of coca
cultivation for traditional use in the Yungas region, and allows legal coca markets in
both the Yungas and Chapare regions.
For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on
controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to
Colombia to be processed into cocaine.  In support of Bolivia’s counternarcotics
efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative
development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development
assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance.  Bolivia, like Peru, has
been viewed by many as a counternarcotics success story, with joint air and riverine
interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and effective alternative
development programs.  Others, however, view the forced eradication as a social and
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political disaster that has fueled popular discontent and increased the political support
for opposition candidates. 
U.S programs supporting alternative development in Bolivia are explicitly
linked to coca eradication.  Coca farmers wanting to participate in alternative
development programs must agree to manually eradicate all of their coca crops.  This
policy has been controversial.  Critics argue that alternative crops take time to
produce a profit, and until then, families are without income.  In some areas,
recipients claim that depressed prices for some alternative crops, like bananas and
hearts of palm, as well as delays in extension services and marketing assistance, are
making a livelihood from licit crops unobtainable.  Supporters argue that the
objective is to realize a decrease in coca cultivation; linking eradication with
alternative development is, therefore, a reasonable strategy.15
Gas Exports
According to the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of
Energy, Bolivia has the potential to become a natural gas hub for the Southern Cone
of South America, and a major exporter of liquified natural gas to Mexico and the
United States.  Bolivia’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated to be as high as
55 trillion cubic feet (tcf).  This would potentially make Bolivia a major world
natural gas exporter with the second-largest gas reserves in South America, after
Venezuela. A decision in 2001 by Repsol-YPF of Spain, British Gas, and British
Petroleum to create a liquified natural gas (LNG) export consortium had raised hopes
to export gas via pipeline and tankers to Mexican and U.S. markets by 2005.  As
Bolivia is landlocked, the country, and the companies involved, had been planning
the construction of an estimated 430-mile pipeline to a port in either Chile or Peru
at a cost of an estimated $5 billion.16  A proposal to export gas through ports in Chile,
a traditional adversary of Bolivia, sparked the protests in 2003 that led to the
resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada.  Since then, the issue of gas exports has
come to dominate relations with its neighbors.  While building a pipeline through
Peru would be more expensive, it is the public’s preferred option, and recent acts by
President Mesa indicate that he is working in that direction.17  However, the
development of Bolivia’s oil and gas sector, as well as related exports, are
jeopardized by the new hydrocarbons law recently passed by the Bolivian Congress,
judging by the reaction of foreign owned oil and gas companies.
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Trade Issues
Bolivia is a member of the Andean Community, with Peru, Ecuador, Colombia,
and Venezuela, and an associate member of Mercosur, the trading block composed
of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.  The main destinations for Bolivian
exports are Brazil, Colombia, Switzerland, and the United States.  The United States
is its third most important source of imports, following Argentina and Brazil.  Its
principal exports are natural gas, soya, zinc and gold.  Bolivia currently benefits from
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act18 (ATPDEA), which offers
access to the U.S. market for products from the Andean countries of Peru, Colombia,
Ecuador and Bolivia.  ATPDEA, an extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA) that began in 1991, will expire in 2006.  During 2004, the United States and
the Andean Community nations of Colombia, Peru and Ecuador began negotiating
an Andean Free Trade Agreement.19  Bolivia is not directly participating; instead it
has observer status.  Many observers believe Bolivia will eventually be included in
an agreement.
U.S. Assistance
Bolivia is the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in Latin America,
behind Colombia and Peru.  In FY2005, it will receive an estimated $149 million in
U.S. assistance, and a proposed $148 million in FY2006.  The largest portion of
assistance consists of Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) funds, the U.S. program
to curtail drug production and trafficking in the Andean region.  ACI funds programs
to eradicate drug crops, interdict trafficking operations, as well as to support
alternative economic development and democracy promotion.  In FY2005, the State
Department estimates spending $90 million in ACI funds in Bolivia, of which $41
million is for alternative development and institution building programs, and $49
million for interdiction efforts.  The FY2006 request is for $80 million.  Alternative
development includes economic development in coca-growing areas, demand-
reduction education programs, and the expansion of physical infrastructure. Funds
are also planned to support the enhancement of judicial capability to prosecute
narcotics-related crimes, and to improve the quality of investigations into allegations
of human rights violations. Interdiction funding provides operational support for
specialized counterdrug police and military units, and is intended to improve data
collection for law enforcement activities.  ACI funds will also be used to support
increased interdiction of precursor chemicals and cocaine products.  The United
States would also continue to provide support for a U.S.-owned helicopter fleet, and
to maintain and purchase vehicles, riverine patrol boats, training and field equipment,
and construct and refurbish antiquated counternarcotics bases.   
Bolivia also receives Foreign Military Financing funds that in FY2005 total
nearly $2 million, with a request of $1.8 million for FY2006.  FMF funds in FY2005
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are for equipment and training assistance to the Bolivian Armed Forces, military
police units, and the Army’s new Counter-Terrorism Unit to support their efforts to
provide security for drug eradication and interdiction operations, to maintain control
of remote areas, and to support their role as international peacekeepers.  Bolivia has
peacekeeping forces deployed in the Congo, and observers in Kosovo, Sierra Leone,
Liberia, and East Timor.  Bolivia receives small amounts of International Military
Education and Training (IMET) funds, totaling $800,000 in each of FY2005 and
FY2006.  IMET funds are used for provide professional military education to
Bolivian military personnel at U.S. military command and staff colleges.  Bolivia has
signed an agreement exempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, as required by the American Service Members
Protection Act of 2002 (incorporated as Title II of H.R. 4775, the FY2002
Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-206).  In July 2003, and previous to an
agreement being signed, the Bush Administration had waived the withholding of U.S.
military aid from the country.
In addition to ACI funding, Bolivia also benefits from other U.S. economic
assistance programs.  Bolivia will receive an estimated $12 million in Development
Assistance (DA) for FY2005, and a requested $14.5 million in FY2006.  This
assistance will provide technical assistance to micro-finance institutions, micro-
entrepreneurs, and technological services to farmers.  Support will also be provided
for strengthening democracy and anti-corruption programs.  Bolivia will receive an
estimated $16 million in Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds in FY2005, and a
requested $15 million in FY2006. CSH funds are used for supporting health
programs, HIV/AIDS programs, nutrition and vaccination programs for children, and
the Amazon Malaria Initiative.  P.L. 480 food assistance is estimated at $17 million
in FY2005 and $25 million for FY2006, and are to be used to improve nutrition for
vulnerable populations.  Economic Support Funds, estimated at $8 million for both
FY2005 and FY2006, will be used to strengthen municipal governments, improve
congressional capacities, consolidate democratic values and practices by supporting
civil service activities, and promote economic growth.  The Peace Corps maintains
a presence in Bolivia with a program that totals $3 million in each of FY2005 and
FY2006.
Bolivia could also benefit from the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA),
a presidential initiative announced in 2002 that is intended to increase foreign
assistance to countries below a certain income threshold that are pursuing policies to
promote democracy, social development, and sustainable economic growth.  The
program is administered by the newly established Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) in cooperation with USAID.  Bolivia was named an eligible recipient in the
first round of the program, meaning that Bolivia may submit a proposal to the MCC
for consideration.  Eligible countries are responsible for designing national
development strategies and individual projects, with the MCC acting in an advisory
role.
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Implications for U.S. Policy
Recent developments in Bolivia offer challenges to U.S. policy with regard to
coca cultivation, the policy of opening economies to free trade and free market
principles, and regional stability.  Until setbacks starting in 2001, Bolivia was
considered a success story in the eradication of coca cultivation.  It is legal to grow
limited amounts of coca leaf in the Yungas province for traditional uses, but is illegal
in all other parts of the country.  A lessening in resolve on the part of the Bolivian
government with regard to coca eradication could embolden coca growers in other
nations to organize, especially in areas such as Peru where indigenous communities
also use coca leaf for medicinal and cultural purposes.  Leakages of coca from
traditional uses to narcotics would be seen as a setback for U.S. policy.  Some
observers contend that U.S. drug policies may cause wider instability in the region
and fuel anti-American sentiment.  The re-emergence of the leftist Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) guerrilla group in Peru’s coca-growing areas is pointed to as a
potential source of trouble, where growing opposition to U.S. policy makes
inhabitants more amenable to violent protest, or to join the ranks of Sendero.20
Opponents of U.S. antinarcotics policy argue that it is heavy handed and stresses
eradication to the neglect of sustainable economic development.  Proponents of U.S.
policy argue that the drug trade promotes violence and corruption in source countries
that destabilize democratic governments.
As the United States promotes free trade and continues negotiations of free trade
agreements in the region, protests against globalization and the degree of foreign
investment complicate these negotiations. Protests in Argentina during 2001 and
2002 were fueled by anti-IMF sentiment, and Brazil’s President Lula da Silva ran on
a platform of resisting globalization.  The United States has not engaged opposition
leader Evo Morales to date.  If he gains more popular support, or becomes a viable
candidate for President in the 2007 elections, the United States could be faced with
a Bolivian government that is less willing to work with Washington on both drug and
trade issues. 
Recent developments in Bolivia have regional implications with regard to the
role of indigenous movements and public attitudes toward free market policies and
international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank.  The resignation
of President Sánchez de Lozada has emboldened the loose coalition of workers,
Indians, and students in Bolivia to make demands for concrete changes in
government policy.  As such movements exist at varying levels of strength
throughout the Andean region, some observers have noted that they, too, could
become more active, adopting the same tactics of demonstrations, strikes, and road
blockages that have become the norm in Bolivia.  Brazil has its own landless
movement where groups have illegally occupied land.  Peru and Mexico have also
experienced dissatisfied indigenous groups, some of whom have resorted to armed
confrontations with government authorities.   Other governments in the region have
experienced vocal opposition to Washington-backed economic policies of
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privatization and foreign investment, similar to the sentiment expressed by Bolivian
demonstrators. 
The re-emergence of tensions with Chile is another ramification of political
discord in Bolivia.  The proposal to export natural gas via a pipeline to Chilean ports
has re-ignited nationalist sentiment and created calls by some Bolivians, including
Evo Morales and Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, to demand that Chile grant
Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, something that the Chilean
government rejects.  A free trade agreement between Chile and Bolivia that was to
be signed in November 2003 has been postponed, citing a number of outstanding
issues that needed to be resolved.  Bolivia and Chile do not have formal diplomatic
relations, but high-level discussions on trade and border issues have been held.  The
situation has also created tensions between Chile and Peru; the latter must agree to
any ceding of territory to Bolivia, according to the treaty that ended the War of the
Pacific, while Chile insists that the dispute is a bilateral issue only.  Instead, Peru and
Bolivia are pursuing agreements that could lead to natural gas exports via Peruvian
ports.21
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Figure 1. Map of Bolivia
